Vera Sententia de Actione Intellectus Agentis. Cap. IV
Chapter 4: The Correct view of the activity of the Agent Intellect
DE actione igitur mentis agentis ego hanc esse puto veritatem iuxta Aristotelem opinionem, vt agere dicatur in intellectum patibilem, non in phantasmata, sed phantasmatibus iungatur vt forma constituens obiectum motivum intellectus patibilis; clarum hoc est considerantibus argumentum Aristotelis in Context 17. eius libri; ibi namque constitutio intellectu patiente colligit mentis agentis necessitatem, quia nihil imperfectum, & tale potestate vult in sua imperfectione manere, sed ad perfectionem ducatur necesse est; non potest autem semet ipsum perficere; ergo requirit agens, a quo perficiatur, ducaturque de potestate ad actum; agit ergo mens agens in mentem patientem, non in phantasmata, sed eis iungitur ut forma.
Regarding the action of the agent mind then, I believe this to be the correct view for Aristotle: that it is said to act upon the passive intellect and not upon phantasms, but comes together with phantasms as a form that creates the moving object of the passive intellect. This argument is clear from what Aristotle considers in Context 17 of the same book: for, he there infers the necessity of an agent intellect from the nature of the patient intellect, since nothing incomplete and in a state of potentiality of that kind wishes to remain in an imperfect state, but must necessarily be led to its natural state of completion. But, it cannot bring itself to a state of completion on its own; therefore, it requires an agent by which it’s potentiality might be fulfilled and led from a state of potentiality to one of actuality. Therefore, the mental agent acts upon the the passive mind and not upon phantasms, but is conjoined to them as their form.
Vnde colligimus, quomodo agat in intellectum patibilem: non enim agit vt solus, & vt agens distinctum a phantasmatibus, tum quia sequeretur posse absque phantasmate intellectionem fieri, tum etiam quia agit vt habitus, & forma phantasmatum: agit igitur vt iunctus phantasmatibus, ita vt ex vtrisque vnum consitituatur obiectum perfectum, & potens in intellectu patibili speciem producere; quare vnum tantum est agens, ipsum phantasma, lumen vero intellectus agentis non est agens separatum, sed est perfectio phantasmatis, quae constituit obiectum perfectum, & potens movere intellectu patibilem.
We deduce from this the way in which the agent acts upon the passive mind: for, it does not act like the sun, nor as acting apart from phantasms, both since it would follow that understanding might occur without a phantasm and also since it acts as an enactive capacity and as the form of phantasms. Therefore, it acts as something conjoined to phantasms, so that, from each of the two, one perfected object is brought into being that is capable of producing its intelligible form in the passive intellect. From thence it follows that there is only one agent, the phantasm itself, while the light of the agent intellect is not a separate agent, but is the enactment of a phantasm that brings into being a completed, perfected object, capable of moving the passive intellect.
Ideo recta est illorum sententia, qui dicunt intellectum agentem esse agentem vt intelligibilem potius, quam vt intelligentem; quia si debet reddere phantasma actu intelligibile, oportet ipsum per se esse actu intelligibilem, quemadmodum etiam lumen, quatenus est per se visibile, non quatenus videns, reddit colorem actu visibilem:
est quidem necessarium vt ipse quoque sit intellectus aliquis, quia omne actu intelligibilis est intellectus, non in hoc tamen consistit ratio agentis, sed in eo quod sit actu Intelligibilis: hoc autem non ita accipiedum est, vt dicamus ipsum ita intelligibilem esse, vt a nostro intellectu intelligatur secundum propriam naturam, & quatenus est quaedam substantia abiuncta a materia; hoc enim fortasse est vltimum, quod a nobis cognoscitur: sed eatenus dicitur agere vt intelligibilis, quatenus est ratio intelligibilitatis aliorum, id est, quatenus est actus, & perfectio, qua caetera redduntur intelligibilia;
Therefore, the opinion of those who speak of the agent intellect as an intelligible agent rather than as an intelligent one is correct, since, if it must render an image actually intelligible, it is necessary that it should, itself, be intrinsically actually intelligible, as is also the case with light, in that it is because it is intrinsically visible and not because it is perceptive, that renders color actually visible.
In fact, it is necessary that it too should itself be something understood (since anything actually intelligible is known); however, the nature of the agent does not consist in this, but in the fact that it is actually intelligible. This should not, however, be taken as indicating that it is intelligible to the extent that it is understood by our intellect according to its proper nature and insofar as it is a substance separated from matter: for this is perhaps the final thing we know. But to the extent that it is said to act in such a way that it is intelligible, it is a means for the intelligibility of other things; that is, inasmuch as it is the actuality and the full actualization of a thing’s potential by which other things are rendered intelligible.
proinde dicitur intelligibilis, non quod ipse intelligatur; sed quod per ipsum alia intelligantur; sic enim & lumen una cum colore locum habet vnius obiecti visibilis, & moventis; non enim quod ipse sol, seu eius lumen videri separatim dicatur, sed quia est ratio, qua colores sunt actu visibiles.
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Facultas igitur passiva intellectus patibilis non respicit aliud agens, quam obiectum phantasma; sed hoc non potest agere, nisi ab intellectu agente perficiatur, & fiat obiectum actu motivum: quare intellectus agens est forma, qua obiectum fit actu obiectum, proinde respicit obiectum ut forma, patibilem vero intellectum ut agens, non quidem agens separatum, sed ut forma constitutiva agentis.
Accordingly, it is called intelligible, not because it is itself understood, but because other things may be understood by means of it, as, for example, also happens in the case of light when, with one color it shares a location with one visible, moving object. For, it is not because the sun itself or its light is said to be seen separately, but because it is a medium, that colors become actually visible.
It follows, then, that the passive faculty of the passive intellect is not oriented toward any agent other than a phantasm-object. But, it cannot act unless it is perfected by the agent intellect and becomes an actually moving object: hence, the agent intellect is the form whereby an object becomes an actual object. Accordingly, the agent intellect is related to its object as its form, but to the passive intellect as an agent–not, to be sure as a separate agent, but as the constitutive form of an agent.
Haec est absque dubio sententia Aristotelis, quam ipse magno cum artificio significavit: nam in context. illo 17. docuit rationem agentis esse respectu intellectus patibilis, deinde in 18. modum actionis declaravit, ne intelligeremus esse agens distinctium ab obiectis; comparavit enim utrunque intellectum cum obiectis dicens, hic fit omnia, ille vero omnia facit, idest facit esse actu intelligibilia; facit autem ut habitus quidam, idest ut forma & perfectio, quae obiectis iuncta consitituit obiectum actu, & perfectum, quemadmodum declaravimus.
This is without doubt Aristotle’s opinion, which he indicated with great finesse: for instance, in the aforementioned Context 17 he explained that it is of the nature of an agent to exist in connection with the passive intellect; then, in Context 18, he explicated its mode of action so that we should not mistake it for an agent that is distinct from its object: in fact, he compares each intellect with its object, saying, this “becomes all things,” whereas the other “makes all things,” which is to say that it makes them actually intelligible. Furthermore, it “makes” them intelligible, certainly, by way of its capacity, i.e. as their form and actualization, which, when it has been joined to its objects, brings into being an actual, finished object as we have explained.
