Collectio officiorum intellectus agentis, septem propositionibus Cap. IIX.
Chapter 8: A Collection of the Activities Proper to the Agent Intellect, in Seven Propositions
[1020 B] QVAE igitur sint officia intellectus agentis in nostra intellectione, satis ex iis qua diximus, manifestum est: vt autem omnia quae, hactenus declarauimus, breuiter colligamus, tota rei veritas iuxta Aristotelem sententiam in his septem assertionibus iam a nobis satis superque demonstratis constituta est.
[1020 B] Therefore, what the activities proper to the agent intellect in our intellectual activity might be has been made clear enough from what has been said. But so that we might bring together everything we have discussed up to now, we will briefly gather together the whole truth concerning Aristotle’s opinion as has been established in the following seven propositions, now that it has been sufficiently well established by us in the foregoing proofs.
[Prima conlcusio]
Prima assertio est: intellectus agens respectu obiectorum non est agens, sed perfectio, & forma, qua ipsis phantasmatibus iuncta perfecit ipsa, & facit vt sint [C] obiectum* actu, hoc est, idoneum ad mouendum intellectum patibilem.
*I believe this to be an error in the text. Valverde’s edition likewise prints obiectum, a singular as opposed to a plural form as “obiectorum” in the lines above would lead one to expect .
[First Conclusion]
The first Assertion is: the agent intellect, with respect to its objects, is not an agent, but a actualized potency and a form whereby, when it has conjoined with the aforementioned phantasms, it actualizes a potentiality in them and acts upon them in such a way that they become actual objects, that is, sufficient for moving the passive intellect.
[Secunda]
Secunda est: intellectus agens iungitur obiectis extra intellectum patibilem, videlicet vt in phantasia existentibus.
[Tertia]
Tertia est: intellectus agens dicitur agens respectu intellectus patientis, quia in ipsum solum agit.
[Second]
The second is: the agent intellect is conjoined with its objects outside the passive intellect, that is, to objects as they exist in the imagination.
[Third]
The third is: the agent intellect is referred to as an “agent” with respect to the patient intellect, since it acts upon it alone.
[Quarta]
Quarta est: hic intellectus, non ita agit in intellectum patibilem, vt sit agens distinctum, & seiunctum a phantasmatibus, sed vt actus phantasmatum, ita vt ex phantasmatibus, & intellectu agente constituatur vnum agens imprimens in intellectu patibili speciem vniuersalis, & quidditatis; quia phantasmata propriis viribus non essent apta ad imprimendam aliam speciem, quam singularis confusi.
[Fourth]
The fourth is: this intellect does not act upon the passive intellect as an agent distinct and separate from phantasms, but as the actualizing principle of images, so that a single agent is constituted out of phantasms and the activity of the agent intellect, an agent that imprints upon the passive intellect its universal intelligible form and whatness, since the phantasms would not, by their own potencies, be ready to impress any intelligible form other than a confused singular.
[Quinta]
Quinta, quae ex hac quarta deducitur, intellectus agens est agens vt intelligibilis, non vt intellectus, & agit ad modum obiecti; quare quatenus est agens, non est formaliter intelligens; quanquam ex hoc infertur necessario ipsum esse alterum intellectum, quia omne actu intelligibili est intellectus.
[Fifth]
The fifth conclusion, which is deduced from the fourth, is that the agent intellect is an agent inasmuch as it is intelligible, not inasmuch as it is understood, and acts as an object. Therefore, insofar as it is an agent, it does not “understand” in the proper sense of the word, although it is inferred from this argument that it is necessarily another intelligible object, since everything that is actually intelligible is understood.
[Sexta]
Sexta est: intellectus agens non producit in intellectu patibili actum intelligendi, sed ipsemet patibilis intellectus hunc actum producit, dum receptam speciem iudicat.
[Sixth]
The sixth is: the agent intellect does not produce the act of understanding in the passive intellect; rather, the passive intellect itself produces this act when it judges an intelligible form it has received.
[Septima]
Septima est: officium abstrahendi non est intellectus agentis, sed est proprium intellectus patibilis; ita tamen, vt abstractio ex necessitate praesupponat operam intellectus agentis, qui phantasmata illustret, & claras, atque conspicuas esse faciat omnes naturas, & quidditates, quae in phantasmatibus in sunt, vt postea patibilis intellectus accipere possit id, quod vult, & alia dimittere, quod vocatur abstrahere: quare abstractio formaliter sumpta est opus solius intellectus patientis, sed antecedenter est opus etiam intellectus agentis, cuius operam abstractionem praecedere necessarium eft.
[Seventh]
The seventh is: the work of abstracting does not pertain to the agent intellect, but is an activity proper to the passive intellect, and in such a way that, of necessity, abstraction presupposes the work of the agent intellect, which illuminates phantasms and makes all natures and quiddities clear and conspicuous that are in phantasms, so that, afterward, the passive intellect may receive what it wishes and dismiss other things, which is called abstracting. Therefore, abstraction, formally understood, is the work of the patient intellect alone, but is, antecedently, the work of the agent intellect, whose work must necessarily precede abstraction.
