Solutio dubij aduersus ea quae dicta sunt. Cap. VII.
Ch. 7: The Resolution of a Doubt, Raised Against what has been Said
SED aduersus haec dubium oritur; si enim abstrahere esset munus intellectus patibilis, ergo esset pati, quia officium intellectus patibilis est pati; id tamen videtur esse falsum, & repugnare propriae huius vocis significationi, nam abstractio actionem potius, quam passionem significat:quod argumentum mihi videtur Auerroem mouisse ad dicendum abstractionem esse operationem intellectus agentis.
But against this, the following question arises: if the role of the passive intellect were in fact to abstract, then abstraction would indicate something passive, since the role of the passive intellect is to be passive. But this seems incorrect and to conflict with the proper signification of the term, since “abstraction” signifies an activity rather than a being acted upon-an argument that appears to me to have motivated Averroes to say that abstraction is the work of the agent intellect.
[Intellectus noster in cognoscendo agit]
Ad hoc dicimus, verum quidem illud esse, quod ex vi vocabuli sumitur, abstractionem esse actionem, sed negandum esse, patibilis intellectus officium esse solum pati, quia licet Arist. dixerit intelligere esse pati, [1019 A] quia secundum originem est pati, & facilius ad cognoscendam eius naturam ducimur per pati, quam per agere, tamen intelligere est etiam agere; nam cognoscere non in sola specierum receptione, quae passio eft, consistit, sed etiam in receptarum iudicatione, qua est actio;
[Our Intellect Acts in the Process of Thinking]
In response to this, we say that this is in fact true, since abstraction, by the force of the term, signifies an action. But it should be denied that the role of the passive intellect is only to be passive: since, even though Aristotle said that to understand is to be acted upon (since its origin is passive) and we are led more easily to learn about its nature by considering it as passive than as active, nevertheless, to learn is also to be active. For, understanding does not consist of the reception of a form alone, which is a passive state, but also in the judgment of what it has been received, which is an activity.
quare patibilis intellectus speciem quidem recipiendo patitur, sed eam iudicando agit, & ita agendo dicitur abstrahere, quo sit, vt intellectio dicatur actio immanens, quia sit ab ipso patibili intellectu, & ipsomet recipitur.
Therefore, the passive intellect is indeed passive when it receives an intelligible form; however, it acts when judging it and thus is said to abstract when it acts. Therefore, the act of understanding is considered an immanent act, since it is accomplished uniquely by the passive intellect and any form is received by it alone.
[Auerrois Error]
[B] Hoc significare voluit Alexander in loco ab Auerroe citato, quando dixit intellectum humanum magis declarari per agere quam per pati; hoc est, eius naturam ratione operationis magis in actione quam in passione esse constitutam: quem locum non intelligens Auerroes traxit ea verba ad intellectum agentem, quasi Alexander dicere voluerit intellectum agentem obtinere in anima humana praecipuum locum, & patibili [C] intellectui antecellere non quidem tempore, sed dignitate, quia nobilius est agere, quam pati.
[Averroes’ Error]
Alexander intended to indicate this in the place cited by Averroes, when he said that the human intellect is better explained by action than being acted upon, which is to say that its nature, due to the manner of its activity, is based more upon acting than being acted upon. Averroes, not understanding this text, applied these words to the agent intellect as though Alexander intended to say that the agent intellect holds a primary place in the human soul and that it surpasses the passive intellect not merely in time, but in rank or worth, since it is more noble to act than to be acted upon.
Attamen Alexander ibi non de illa actione loquitur, quae attribuitur intellectui agenti, sed de illa, quae est propria intellectus patibilis, & est speciei recepta iudicatio; vult enim ijs verbis significare cognitionem magis in iudicatione, quam in receptione consistere: nam si receptiо tempore iudicationem praecederet, vtique clarum esset intellectionem esse formaliter iudicationem, non receptionem, nisi antecedenter; [D] sed quum simul tempore receptio, & iudicatio fiant, dicimus intellectionem esse simul passionem, & actionem, sed magis in actione, quam in passione consistere.
However, Alexander does not speak there concerning the activity which is attributed to the agent intellect, but about the activity proper to the passive intellect, the judgment of a received species. For, he wishes to indicate by those words that learning consists more in judgment than in reception: for, if reception were to precede judgment in time, then it would be even more clear that the act of understanding would be essentially an act of judgment, and not of reception, except antecedently. But since reception and judgment occur together at the same time, we say that intellectual activity is at once passivity and activity, but that it consists more in action than in passion.
[Intellectus agens non producit actum intelligendi]
Ex his colligimus errorem illorum, qui dicunt officium esse intellectus agentis producere in intellectu patibili actum intelligendi; hoc enim falsum est, quoniam actus intelligendi producitur ab ipsomet intellectu patibili, dum receptam speciem iudicat; [E] agens vero non iudicat, neque iudiciam producit, sed id solum praestat, quod antea diximus; iunctus enim phantasmati ipsum aptum reddit ad speciem quidditatis in intellectu patibili imprimendam:
[The Agent Intellect does not Produce the Act of Understanding]
From these considerations, we may gather the error of those who say that the proper activity of the agent intellect is to produce the act of understanding in the passive intellect. This is false, since the act of understanding is produced by the passive intellect itself, when it judges a received species. But the agent does not judge, nor does it produce a judgment, but merely stands apart, as we said earlier. For, when it has been conjoined with a phantasm, it makes it ready to impress its intelligible quiddity upon the passive intellect.
propterea si intellectio esset sola receptio in intellectu patibili, absque dubio dicendum esset ab intellectu agente vna cum phantasmate produci actum intelligendi in intellectu nostro, quum species impressa idem sit, quod intellectio: sed quoniam intellectio non [F] est sola receptio, sed etiam iudicatio, imo est praecipue iudicatio, & haec fit a solo intellectu patiente, siquidem ipse ad iudicandam speciem est sibi sufficiens ex propria sua natura sine ope intellectus agentis; ideo non dicimus intellectum agentem producere intellectionem in intellectu patiente, hoc enim neque solus facit, neque phantasmatibus iunctus, nisi vt causare [1020 A] mota, & antecedens; causa enim proxima, & aequata est ipsemet patibilis intellectus, qui sua natura speciem receptam iudicat
Therefore, if intellection was merely a reception in the passive intellect, then without doubt it could be said that the act of understanding in our intellect is produced by the agent intellect with a single phantasm, since an intelligible form, once it has been impressed, is one with the act of understanding. But since intellection is not merely reception, but also judgment, intellectual activity is, to the contrary, most especially an act of judgment, which occurs through the patient intellect alone, if indeed it is sufficient unto itself for the judgment of an intelligible form from the resources of its own proper nature, apart from the activity of the agent intellect. Accordingly, we do not say that the agent intellect produces intellection in the patient intellect, since it neither acts alone, nor when it has been conjoined with phantasms, except in order to cause movement antecedently. For the passive intellect is itself its proximate and adequate cause, which, by its nature, judges a received, intelligible form.
