De abstractione, an fiat ab intellectu patibilis, an ab agente. Cap. VI
Chapter 6: On Abstraction: Whether it Occurs by the Activity of the Passive Intellect or by that of the Agent
DIGNUM consideratione hic est, a quonam fiat abstractio, an ab intellectu patibili, an ab agente, hoc enim cognitio, erit plene cognitum officium intellectus agentis:
[Averrois, & latinorum opinio]
plurium sententia est abstractione fieri ab intellectu agente; nam Latinorum plures hoc dicunt, & Averroes quoque aperte id asserit in Comment. 18, lib 3. de Anima. & in calce 20 vbi dicit Aristotel. fuisse coactum ponere intellectum agentem propter abstractionem, quia eius actio ipsius est abstractio, abstrahit enim a phantasmatibus vniuersale, & ipsum denudat omni materiali conditione;
The following is worthy of consideration: how abstraction occurs, whether by means of the passive intellect or by the agent: for, by coming to know this, the complete, proper activity of the agent intellect will be understood.
[The Opinion of the Latin Commentators and of Averroes]
The opinion of many is that abstraction occurs by means of the agent intellect, because most of the Latin authors say this and Averroes too openly asserts it in Commentary 18, Book III of the De Anima, and at the end of 20 where he says that Aristotle had been compelled to assert the existence of an agent intellect for the sake of abstraction, since its activity is abstraction, for, it abstracts the universal from images and strips it bare of all material conditions.
ideoque intellectio intellectus patibilis nil aliud est, quam receptio huius vniuersalis ita abstracti ab agente; & actio ipsius agentis nil aliud est quam abstractio vniuersalium ab omni conditione materiae, vt movere possit intellectum patientem; illud igitur, quod vocari solet, facere de intellectis potestate actu intellecta apud Auerroem est abstrahere, proinde abstrahere officium solius agentis;
Therefore, the intellectual activity of the passive intellect is nothing more than a reception of this universal as it is abstracted by the agent. Furthermore, the action of the agent itself is nothing more than the abstraction of universals from all material conditions, so that it may move the passive intellect. Therefore, that well-known saying is typically invoked, that for Averroes, abstraction is making what is potentially understood, actually understood, so that abstraction is the work of the agent alone.
citat etiam Auerr. dictum Alexandri, quod apud eum legimus in li, 2. de Anima, in capite de intellectu agente; ibi enim Alexander dicit, non solum esse necessaria in anima intellectiua vtramque vim, vnam agendi, alteram patiendi, sed etiam melius declarari naturam intellectus per agere, quam per pati: quod declarans Averroes dicit intellectum per pati non differe a sensu, sed folum per agere, quia non datur sensus agens, sed datur intellectus agens, qui fabricat intelligibilia, quod dicitur abstrahere.
Furthermore, Averroes cites a passage written by Alexander of Aphrodisias we may read in his De Anima, Book II, in the chapter on the agent intellect. For, in that passage, Alexander says not only that it is necessary that each of the two powers is in the intellect, one for enacting, the other for undergoing change, but also that it would be better to explain the nature of the intellect with regard to its being active rather than as passive. When commenting on these lines, Averroes says that the intellect does not differ from sense insofar as its passivity is concerned, but only with regard to its activity, since a sensory agent is not supplied, whereas an agent intellect is provided that produces intelligible things, which is called “abstraction.”
[Confutatio]
Haec sententia recipienda non est, & impugnatur efficacissime argumento Ioannis Gandauensis, licet ipse ad aliud demonstrandum eo abutatur; nam probare volens intellectum agentem
non agere in phantasmata, & eis nihil tribuere, ita argumentatur: intellectus agens, si phantasmata illuminat, aeque omnia in eis existentia illuminat, aeque omnia intelligibilia facit, nec potest vnum expoliare alijs & ab eis separare & facere vt vnum sine alio intelligatur; quemadmodum lumen picturam aliquam feriens facit aeque omnes eius colores esse visibiles, aeque omnes illustrat, nec facit vt vnum videatur sine alio; ergo intellectus agens nihil phantasmatibus tribuit, & nihil in eis operatur.
[Refutation]
This opinion should not be accepted, and is efficaciously thwarted by Jean of Jandun’s argument, although he himself mistakenly applies it to a different proof, since he intends to show that the agent intellect does not act upon phantasms, and contributes nothing to them. The argument proceeds as follows: if the agent intellect illuminates images, it illuminates everything equally that exists in its light, and makes all things intelligible equally. It can neither embellish nor add anything to them; nor can it separate anything from them; nor can it even act so that one thing is understood without the other, just as light, shining upon a picture, making all its colors equally visible, illuminates everything equally and does not act upon it in such a way that one thing is seen to the exclusion of another. Therefore, the agent intellect contributes nothing to the images and in no way operates upon them.
Sed haec consequentia reuera inefficax est, & loannes fallaciam committit a secundum quid, ad simpliciter; quia hoc argumentum probat quidem Intellectum agentem non separare, seu abstrahere vnum ab alio, quoniam aeque illuminat totum phantasma, & omnia, quae in eo sunt; proinde est efficacissimum ad probandum quod intellectus agens non possit facere abstrationem quum nihil aliud sit abstractio, quam separatio vnius ab alijs, & acceptio vnius non acceptis aliis: at non probat intellectum agentem nil prorsus in phantasmatibus operari; operatur enim aliquid necessarium pro abstractione, licet non faciat ipse abstractionem, vt mox declarabimus: quando enim rem aliquam ab alia re abstrahere volumus, & eam sumere non sumpta illa alia, certum est necessarium esse vt vnam ab alia distinctam habeamus; quia si confusae & commixtae sint, id facere minime possumus; vt si nobis offeratur aqua vino comista, non est in nostra facultate accipere vinum non accepta aqua, quod dicitur abstrahere; quod si quispiam aliquo artificio vinum ab aqua separaret; ita vt vtraque distincta inspicerentur, facile nobis esset vnum accipere relicto altero:
However, its conclusion is, in truth, unsound and Jean commits the fallacy of arguing “from the qualified case to an absolute claim,” since the argument does show that the agent intellect does not separate or abstract one thing from another because it illuminates the whole image equally and everything within it. Accordingly, it is most useful for showing that the agent intellect cannot enact abstraction, since abstraction is nothing other than the separation of one thing from another, and the reception of one thing to the exclusion of another. However, it does not prove that the agent intellect does not act upon phantasms in any way whatsoever. For, it acts upon them as something necessary for abstraction, though it does not produce abstraction itself, as we shall now make clear: for, when we want to abstract one thing from another and take it up while leaving other things behind, it is certain that we must necessarily hold one thing distinct from the others, since, if they are confused and mixed together, we may hardly do so. For example, if water is offered to us mixed with wine, it is not in our power to take the wine without also receiving the water, which is what is meant by “abstracting” it. But if someone were to separate wine from water by some device, so that each one could be examined distinctly, it would be easy for us to take the remaining one.
[In abstractione duo sint consideranda]
duo igitur actus considerandi sunt; vnus est actus distinguendi rem a re, vt distincte appareant; alter est actus accipiendi vnam dimissis alijs, qui duo actus ad eundem intellectum pertinere non possunt, sed vnus ad agentem, alter ad patientem; quia si abstrahere est accipere vnum dimissis alijs, certe non intellectus agentis officium est, sed patientis, hic enim quidditatem intelligit in phantasmate emicantem, & eam accipit absque conditionibus materia, & absque alijs, quae in eo phantasmate sunt, & sic ea ab alijs abstrahere dicitur:
[Two Things Should be Considered in Abstraction]
Two acts must therefore be considered in the process of abstraction: (1) the act of distinguishing one thing from another so that they may appear distinctly; (2) the act of receiving one thing, while omitting others, which two acts cannot pertain to the same intellect: rather, one belongs to the agent, the other to the patient, since, if to abstract is to receive one thing while omitting others, it is certainly not the work of the agent intellect, but of the patient. For the patient apprehends the quiddity of a thing shining forth in the phantasm and receives it without its material conditions and without the other attributes that are in the phantasm. In this way, it is said to abstract from other things.
at facere id non posset, nisi prius omnia in phantasmate distincta appararent, quae distinctio est opus intellectus agentis; huius enim lumen phantasmati adueniens omnia, quae in eo sunt, aeque illuminat, & facit vt distincte omnia appareant, vt in phantasmate equi facit vt distincte appareant natura corporis, natura viuentis, natura animalis, natura equi, natura quantitatis, & natura qualitatis, & sic aliorum accidentium; haec enim omnia in eo phantasmate confusa, & indistincta erant, sed ab agente illustrata offeruntur patibili intellectui clara, atque distincta, vt ipse ea omnia intuens possit contemplari id, quod vult, tam totum confusum, quam singulam quidditatem in eo emicatem, & еаm omissis alijs intelligere:
But it cannot act unless everything in the phantasm appears distinctly beforehand and making any phantasm distinct is the work of the agent intellect. For, when its light arrives upon a phantasm, it illuminates everything in it equally and acts so that all its attributes appear distinctly. For example, it acts upon the phantasm of a horse, in such a way that the nature of a body, the nature of a living thing, the nature of an animal, the nature of a horse, and of quantity, quality, and so on for other accidents, may appear distinctly, since all these were in the phantasm in a confused and indistinct state. But once illuminated by the agent, they are presented to the passive intellect as clear and distinct, so that it may itself contemplate what it wishes when it considers each of them, whether it be a confused whole or a single quiddity shining forth in it, and understand it when its other attributes have been omitted.
hoc idem in coloribus euenit; quando enim debile est in aere lumen, videmus confuse picturam totam, sed colorum distinctionem non videmus; adueniente autem Solis lumine distincti apparent omnes colores, & omnes tenuissimae lineae, nosque liberi sumus, & apti ad intuendum in ea pictura quicquid volumus dimssis alijs: nam primo loco totum confusum inspicimus, postea ad singulas particulas conuertimur, & intuemur modo hanc sine illa, modo illam sine hac, & hoc visus ipse facit, non lumen, siquidem lumen illustrat solum, atque distinguit, visus vero inspicit hanc partem sine illa, & illam sine hac:
The same thing occurs in the case of colors: for, when light shines weakly in the air, we see a total picture in a confused state, but do not see any distinction among the colors. However, with the appearance of sunlight, all its colors appear distinct, even all its finest lines, and we are free and able to gaze upon whatever we wish in the picture, while disregarding other things: for, we at first consider the confused whole, but afterward turn our attention to the individual particulars and sometimes focus our attention upon one thing while disregarding another and sometimes we attend to the latter without considering the former. Vision itself does this, not light, since, in fact, light merely illuminates and makes clear, while vision considers this part without that, and that without this.
[Nota quae dicatur a philosophis abstractio]
ea tamen a philosophis abstractio non appelatur; quia vt dicatur proprie asbtractio, non satis est si vna res sine alia accipiatur, sed oportet etiam vt de ordine in ordinem transferatur: quod in visione non euenit; oculus enim rem hanc accipiens videndam sine alijs non ob id eam transfert ad alium ordinem rei cognoscibilis, quia ibi omnia sensibilia sunt, tam totum, quam partes;
But the philosopher does not call this abstraction, since, in order that it may be called abstraction, properly speaking, it is not sufficient that one thing be received without the others, but it is also necessary that it be transferred from one order of being into another, which does not occur in the case of vision. For when the eye receives something to be seen apart from others does not, thereby, transfer it to another order of intelligibility, since all things are sensible therein, the whole as much as the parts.
at intellectus abstrahens transfert rem de ordine in ordinem, seu potius talem translationem factam praesupponit, sit tamen revera translatio haec ab agente, qui illustrans facit rem e sensili intellectilem deinde patibilis intellectus eam accipit, & ita abstrahere dicitur: in hoc igitur differt intellectus agens a lumine, quod lumen non transfert colores ad alium gradum cognoscibilitatis, at intellectus agens facit e sensili intellectile.
But when the intellect abstracts, it transfers a thing from one order of being into another-or rather, it presupposes that such a translation has been carried out. Moreover, this translation is, in truth, carried out by the agent, which, when it illuminates, makes of the sensible object something intelligible, whereupon the passive intellect receives it and is thus said to abstract it. Therefore, in this way the agent intellect is said to differ from light, in that light does not transfer colors to another grade of intelligibility, whereas the agent intellect makes something intelligible out of the sensible.
Ex his igitur patet etiam error Averrois, qui putavit abstractionem esse munus intellectus agentis: patet etiam error Ioannis Gandauensis, qui ex hoc colligebat intellectum agentem nil tribuere phantasmatibus; tribuit enim reuera lumen distinguens, sed nullam electionem facit; haec enim sit ab intellectu patiente, diciturque formaliter abstractio, quum actio intellectus, agentis non sit abstractio, nisi antecedenter, quia necessario praecedit abstractionem.
From these considerations, Averroes’ error is furthermore clear, who thought that abstraction was the task of the agent intellect. Jean of Jandun’s mistake is also clear from these considerations, who, from the fact that the agent intellect illuminates phantasms, concluded that it contributes nothing to them. For, the agent intellect does, in truth, bring a distinguishing light to phantasms, although it makes no selection of an object. This is done by the patient intellect and is referred to as “abstraction in a formal sense,” because the action of the agent intellect is not abstraction, except antecedently, since it necessarily precedes abstraction.
