An Intellectus Agens iungatur phantasmatibus in phantasia existentibus, an in intellectu patibili receptis. Cap V.
Chapter 5: Whether the Agent Intellect Interacts with Images when they Exist in the Imagination, or when they have been Received in the Passive Intellect
QUAESTIO explicatu digna est hic oritur, quum intellectus agens iungatur phatasmatibus ut forma, an eis iungatur in phantasia, an postquam in intellectu patibili recepta sunt.
A question worthy of explication surfaces here: Seeing that the agent intellect is united with images as a form, is it united with them in the imagination or afterward when they have been received in the passive intellect?
[Aliquorum Opinio]
Dicunt aliqui non in phantasia hanc coniunctionem fieri, sed lumen agentis phantasmatibus iungi, & ea perficere in ipso intellectu patibili: quod probat argumento tali:
[The Opinion of Some Commentators]
Some say this conjunction does not occur in the imagination, but, rather, that the light of the agent intellect is conjoined with images and brings them to a completed state in the passive intellect itself, as the following kind of argument shows:
[Primum Argumentum]
officium intellectus agentis requiritur propter quidditates, quae in phantasmatibus latent, has enim facit actu intelligibiles; ergo si in phantasia phantasmatibus iungeretur, phantasia cognosceret quidditates, & universalia, quod nemo unquam dixit; non potest igitur intellectus agens munus hoc exercere nisi in phantasmatibus iam in intellectu patibilis receptis.
[The First Argument]
The activity proper to the agent intellect is required on account of the quiddities that are latent in phantasms, since it makes them actually intelligible. Consequently, if it were to interact with images in the imagination, the imagination would understand quiddities and universals, which no one ever claimed. Therefore, the agent intellect cannot perform this function unless the images have already been received in the passive intellect.
[Secundum Argumentum]
Confirmant per illa quae ab Aristoteli dicuntur in contextu 10. libri tertii de Anima; ibi enim inquit, intellectum a solo sensitivo recipere carnem, id est, totum compositum singulare, absque ullo auxilio intellectus agentis; ergo phantasmata sunt per se seipsa sufficienter praesentia intellectui patibili: ut ab eo apprehendantur tanquam confusae quaedam conceptiones singularium,
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per eas tamen non apprehenduntur quidditates, quia non apparent, sed illis confusis conceptionibus adveniens lumen intellectus agentis resoluit eas in quidditatem, & quidditatem a quidditate distinguit, & facit quidditates de intellectis potestate actu intellectas, quae sunt verum obiectum intellectus patibilis;
[The Second Argument]
They confirm their argument by those notorious words Aristotle writes in Context 10, Book III of his De Anima: he says there that the intellect receives “flesh” from sensation alone (i.e., the total singular composite), without any assistance from the agent intellect. Therefore, phantasms are themselves present to a sufficient degree to the passive intellect, so that they may be apprehended by it as though they were certain confused conceptions of individuals.
Nevertheless, their quiddities are not apprehended through these singular conceptions, since their quiddities do not appear. But, when the light of the agent intellect comes into contact with these confused conceptions, it resolves them into a quiddity, distinguishes one quiddity from another, and makes the quiddities of the phantasms that have been potentially understood, actually so. These actually understood quiddities are the true object of the passive intellect.
quum igitur requiratur intellectus agens propter obiectum, hoc est, propter quidditates, ut eas apparere faciat, & hae non cognoscantur nisi ab intellectu, oportet lumen agentis iungi phantasmatibus in intellectu, non in phantasia.
Therefore, since the agent intellect is required for its object, that is, for the quiddities of phantasms, so that it might make them appear and these are not apprehended except by the intellect, it is necessary that the light of the agent should be conjoined with phantasms in the intellect, not in the imagination.
Vtuntur etiam ad hoc declarandum exemplo tali: si velimus in statua cernere aliquas minutissimas lineas, apponimus statuam lumini, vt illustretur, nec quaerimus vt illuminentur oculi, quoniam oculi non egent lumine, sed obiecto illuminato, vt illa, quae confusa erat, appareant, quia absque illo lumine videret quidem oculus statuam, at minutissimas illas lineas non cerneret:
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statua igitur potest per se imprimere in oculo speciem confusam, neque lumen illud requirit, sed solum requiritur propter lineas illas, quibus proportione respondent quidditates latentes in phantasmatibus.
They also make use of the following kind of example to make this point clear: if we wished to discern the most minute lineaments on a statue, we would place the statue under the light so that it would be illuminated. We would not ask that it be illuminated by the eye, since its lineaments are not in need of light from the eye, but from the illuminating object, so that the lines that were “confused” might appear, since without that light, the eye might indeed see a statue, but not discern the lineaments in question. Therefore, the statue can, of itself, impress upon the eye a confused form and does not require the aforesaid light, but it is only required for the sake of the lineaments to which the quiddities latent in phantasms proportionately respond.
[Confutatio]
Haec sententia mihi probari nulla ratione potest, quum per eam tollatur tota ratio agentis: si enim intellectus agens iungit illis confusis conceptionibus iam receptis in intellectu patibili, iungitur potius vt forma, quam vt agens, quod etiam illi concedere videntur, fatentur enim intellectum agentem respectu obiectorum non habere locum agentis, sed formae tantummodo;
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attamen neque respectu intellectus patibilis potest habere locum agentis, hoc enim non potest esse alio modo, nisi quod illae conceptiones ita illuminatae agant in intellectum patibilem, quod nullo pacto dici potest, iam enim inhaerent ipsi intellectui tanquam formae: quare etiam intellectus agens illis iunctus habet locum formae vna cum illis, at forma non agit in subiectum, in quo recepta est; quare intellectus agens nulla ratione haberet locum agentis iuxta illorum opinionem.
[Refutation]
This view cannot be proved to me by any reasoning, since the entire purpose for the agent is thereby removed: for, if the agent intellect comes together with the confused conceptions that have already been received in the passive intellect, it is joined to them as a form rather than as an agent. This is something they even seem to concede, since they admit that the agent intellect does not play the role of an agent with respect to its objects, but only of a form.
But neither does it play the part of an agent with respect to the passive intellect, for this cannot occur in any other way except when those conceptions, when illuminated as described above, act upon the passive intellect. But that simply cannot be said in this case, because their phantasms already inhere in the intellect itself as forms. Therefore, the agent intellect, moreover, when it has come together with those forms, serves as a form that is one with them. But a form does not act upon the subject in which it is received. Therefore, the agent intellect would have had no part to play as an agent in any way, according to the view they have advanced.
Miror etiam, quomodo hoc dicere potuerint, quum omnino negaverint species in intellectu imprimi; id enim si verum est, quomodo possint phantasmata & confusae illae conceptiones in intellectu recipi? Sic enim reciperentur in intellenctu tanquam species distinctae a phantasmatibus, quod ipsi negant, dum negant species impressas.
I am furthermore amazed at how they could say this, since they would absolutely deny that forms are impressed upon the intellect. But if this is in fact true, how could phantasms and those confused conceptions be received in the intellect? For, by that reasoning, they would be received in the intellect as intelligible forms distinct from images, which they themselves deny when they deny impressed intelligible forms.
Ego igitur cogor multorum sententiam sequi, qui dicunt intellectum agentem iungi obiectis nondum in intellectu patibili receptis, sed in phantasia existentibus, quia hoc modo seruatur vera ratio agentis; phantasmata enim sine lumine agentis essent quidem apta ad imprimendam in intellectu patibili conceptionem rei singularis, at non imprimerent speciem quidditatis, nifi essent illuminata ab intellectu agente, qui dat eis vim motricem, & productricem speciei quidditatis;
I therefore draw the conclusion held by many, who say that the agent intellect does not come into contact with its objects when they have been received in the passive intellect, but does so when they exist in the imagination, since in this way the true nature of the agent is maintained. For phantasms without the light of the agent would indeed be ready to impress upon the passive intellect a conception of an individual thing, but would not impress the form of a quiddity unless they were illuminated by the agent intellect, which gives them the motive and productive power of an intelligible form of a quiddity.
facit enim vt in phantasmatibus distincte appareant omnes naturae, & quidditates, sicuti lumen Solis in statua facit vt appareant distincte omnes minutissimae lineae, & vt statua sit apta ad imprimendum in oculo non solum totam imaginem confusam, sed etaim omnes partes, & omnia exilia lineamenta: ideo similitudo ab illis adducta manifeste contra ipsos facit, nam minutissimae illae lineae in statua non indigent lumine eas illustrante, quando iam in oculo receptae sunt, sed extra oculum, & in ipsa statua; ipsi enim fatentur oportere statuam illuminari, non oculum:
For, it’s light acts upon phantasms in the sense that all natures and quiddities appear distinctly, just as the light of the sun upon a statue acts in such a way that all the most minute lineaments may appear distinctly and so that the statue is ready to impress upon the eye not only the whole confused image, but all its parts as well, and all its finest lineaments. Therefore, the similitude they adduce clearly works against them: for, the finest lines on a statue do not require a light illuminating them when they have already been received in the eye, but outside the eye and on the statue itself. For, they themselves admit that the statue needs to be illuminated, not the eye.
sic igitur optime seruatur ratio agentis, nam agentis debet esse externum, vt possit agere in patiens, id vero, quod in ipso patiente recipitur, non est vocandum agens, sed forma.
Thus, it follows that the nature of the agent is best maintained in this way, for its light should be external to the agent so that it can act upon the patient, whereas that which is received in the patient itself should not be called an “agent,” but a form.
[Ad Primum Argumentum]
Ad argumenta autem illorum facile est respondere. Primum erat; si iungeretur phantasmatibus in phantasia, ergo phantasia esset intelligens, & apprehenderet vniuersalia, & quidditates:
[Response to the First Argument]
Moreover, it is easy to respond to the arguments of these commentators. The first was: if it were conjoined with images in the imagination, then the imagination would be intelligent and would apprehend universals and quiddities.
ad hoc neganda est consequentia, & ratio negationis sumitur tum a phantasia, tum ab obiecto ipso: a phantasia, quoniam ipsa non est apta cognoscere vniuersale, & quare etiam si haberet in seipsa speciem vniuersalem non eam cognosceret, quia non est talis facultas, quae ad hanc operationem idonea sit; non potest enim abstrahere vniuersale, & ipsum transferre de gradu in gradum:
In this case, the consequent should be denied. The reason for the negation is taken both from the nature of the imagination and from the object itself: from the nature of the imagination, because it is not itself capable of apprehending the universal. Therefore, if it were to have within itself a universal intelligible form, it would not apprehend it, since it is not the sort of faculty that would be suited to this operation. For, it cannot abstract universally and bring itself from one step in the process of understanding to the next.
hoc possumus confirmare exemplo coloris, & luminis; lumen enim facit ut color parietis fit actu visibilis, partes tamen habens colorem illum illuminatum non est videns, quia vim cognoscendi non habet; quare est quidem color ille visibilis, non tamen a pariete, in quo inest, sed ab oculo, cuius motiuus est: sic etiam in phantasia sunt quidditates in phantasmatibus illuminatae, proinde intelligibiles; non tamen a phantasia, quoniam ipsa hanc vim non habet.
We can confirm this using the example of color and light: for light acts so that the color of a wall becomes actually visible. But the wall does not see its parts having that illuminated color, since it does not have the power of apprehension. Therefore, the color is indeed visible, not, however, to the wall on which it is located, but by the eye it is capable of moving. In the same way, quiddities in the imagination are also illuminated in images, and are accordingly intelligible, though not by the imagination, since it does not itself have that capacity.
Idem ostenditur ratione obiecti: phantasma enim quantumuis ab intellectu agente illuminatum non est formaliter intelligibile, ideo si fieri posset vt idem formaliter acceptum ad intellectum possibilem transferretur, non intelligeretur ab eo; quia phantasma illuminatum vocatur quidem actu intelligibile, non tamen formaliter, sed obiective, nam si ipsummet in intellectu poneretur non fieret intellectio; sed ideo vocatur intelligibile, quia potest producere in intellectu possibili speciem intelligibilem, quae dicitur intelligibilis formaliter, quia ipsamet recipitur in intellectu.
The same point may be raised concerning the object: for despite being illuminated by the agent intellect, their phantasm is not formally intelligible, and so, if it were possible for it to be transferred to the possible intellect, it would not be understood in its formal aspect, because a phantasm which has been illuminated is indeed called actually intelligible, though not formally, but objectively or inasmuch as it is an object: for, if the object itself were put in the intellect, intellection would not occur. Rather, a phantasm is said to be intelligible because it is able to produce an intelligible form in the possible intellect, which is said to be formally intelligible because its particular form is received in the intellect.
Hoc quoque confirmatur eodem exemplo luminis, & coloris: nam color realis, qui in pariete est, licet sit actu illuminatus, & ita actu visibilis, non est tamen visibilis formaliter sed solum obiectiue; quia si idemmet realis color illuminatus posset in oculo poni, non videretur ab eo:
This is also shown by the same example involving light and color. For the real color which is on the wall, though actually illuminated and hence actually visible, is not, for all that, visible as an image-form, but only as an object, since, if the actual, illuminated color could itself put in the eye, it would not thereby be seen by the eye.
[Intelligibile aliquid dicit vel formaliter, vel obiectiue; sic etiam visibile]
ideo actu visibile sumi potest duobus modis, nam coloris species spiritualis in oculo recepta dicitur visibilis formaliter, sed color realis illuminatus visibilis dicitur obiectiue, sed non formaliter. Leuitas igitur argumenti manifesta est, quia neque phantasia est apta intelligere quidditates, neque phantasia est apta intelligere quidditates, neque phantasma illuminatum in phantasia est actu intelligibile formaliter, sed est formaliter imaginabile; intelligibile autem obiectiue, quatenus est obiectum potens extra phantasiam producere in intellectu speciem intelligibilem.
[Any object is either called formally or objectively intelligible and this is also the case with what is visible]
Therefore, “actually visible” can be understood in two ways: for, the spiritual form of color in the eye is said to be formally visible, while the real, illuminated color is called visible in an objective sense, but not in a formal one. Therefore, the ridiculousness of the argument is clear, since the imagination is neither capable of understanding quiddities, nor is the illuminated phantasm in the imagination actually intelligible with regard to its form, although it is formally imaginable, but it is objectively intelligible insofar as it is an object with the capacity to produce an intelligible species outside the imagination in the intellect.
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Alterum argumentum sumebatur ex context. 16. tertij de anima, vbi Aristeles dicit in intellectum recipere compositum confusum a solo sensu sine ope intellectus agentis: vult igitur phantasmata in phantasia existentia non egere lumine agentis, ut sint actu motiua,
sed per esse per se motiua absque illo, proinde lumen agentis non requiri nisi postquam illud confusum intellectu patibili receptum est, nempe vt in eo quidditas elucescat.
[Response to the Second Argument]
The remaining argument was taken from Chapter 16 [in Averroes’ Commentary], in Book III of the De Anima, where Aristotle says that a confused composite is received in the intellect by the sense faculty alone without the assistance of the agent intellect: therefore, Aristotle intends that for images, existence in the imagination should not require the light of the agent in order that they might actually be moved, but are naturally, of themselves, moved without its agency. Accordingly, the light of the agent intellect is not required except after the confused idea has been received by the passive intellect and, in particular, so that its quiddity might shine forth.
Ad hoc dicimus obiectum illud posse duabus rationibus dici actu motiuum; nempe vel ita motiuum, vt totius tantum confusi speciem imprimat; vel ita motiuum, vt imprimat etiam speciem quidditatis latentis in eo confuso: priore quidem modo inquit ibi Arist. phantasma esse per se motiuum intellectus agentis, sed non secundo modo; non est enim ex se ita motiuum, vt possit quidditatem imprimere, nisi illuminetur ab intellectu agente:
Concerning this line of argumentation, we say that such an object can be called “actually moved” in two senses: namely, as moved, so that it impresses the intelligible form of the confused whole; or as moved, so that it also impresses the intelligible form of its quiddity that is latent in the confused whole. Aristotle does, in truth, say that phantasms are, by their very nature, moved by the agent intellect in the first way, but not in the second way: for it is not moved in such a way that it can impress a quiddity unless it is illuminated by the agent intellect.
vult igitur Arist. phantasma illuminari in phantasia, & ita illuminatum imprimere in intellectu speciem quidditatis: quare per hoc argumentum non ostenditur obiectum illuminari in intellectu, sed potius in phantasia; hoc enim demonstrat comparatio quam ibi Aristoteles facit, cum linea flexa; dicit enim cognitionem quidditatis similem esse lineae flexae, quatenus lumen agentis fertur prius ad obiectum in phantasia, deinde cum eo ad intellectum reflectitur.
Therefore, Aristotle intends that images should be illuminated in the imagination and being thus illuminated, to impress upon the intellect the intelligible form of its quiddity: wherefore, the text does not show that the object is illuminated in the intellect, but, rather, in the imagination. This may be demonstrated by a comparison Aristotle makes in that context with curved lines: for he says that the mental recognition of a quiddity is similar to that of a curved line, inasmuch as the light of an agent first shines upon its object in the imagination, but afterward it is thereby reflected upon the intellect.
