Dictarum opinionum confutatio Cap. III
Chapter 3 : Refutation of the Stated Opinions
NOS vero aliorum errores patefaciendo simul ipsam rei veritatem iuxta Aristot. mentem declarabimus.
But we will, at the same time, make clear the very truth of the matter by bringing to light the errors of others, in accordance with Aristotle’s thought.
[Confutatio Opinionis Thomae & Bacconius]
In primis a veritate prorsus aberrant illi, qui dicunt intellectum agentem agere in phantasmata, quoniam, ut modo alios considerasse dicebamus, Aristoteles intellectum agentem invenit propter intellectum patibilem, & ut in eum ageret tanquam patientem.
[Refutation of the Opinions of Aquinas and John Baconthorpe]
In the first case, those who say that the agent intellect acts upon phantasms wander entirely astray from the truth, since, in accordance with the way we said the other sect considered the text, Aristotle came upon the agent intellect by way of the passive intellect, so that it would act upon it as a patient.
[Solutio Argumenti]
Sed obstare nobis videntur verba Aristot. in contextu 18 quando intellectum agentem cum lumine comparat, & significat ipsum agere in phantasmata: iis tamen verbis bene intellectis tolletur omnis difficultas, & ipsa rei veritas manifesta fiet.
[Facere aliquid vel sumitur ad modum formae, vel ad modum agentis]
[Solution to the Argument]
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s words in Context 18 seem to disagree with to ours when he compares the agent intellect with light and indicates that it acts upon images; yet, when these words are properly understood, the entire difficulty will be removed and the real truth of the matter will become evident.
[To “Make” Something is Understood either as Occurring by Way of a Form, or by Way of an Agent]
Sciendum igitur est, quando dicimus aliquid facere de tali potestate tale actu verbum illud [facere] ambiguum esse, & posse intelligi duobus modis, potest enim facere ut forma, potest etiam facere ut agens, forma enim humana adveniens materiae, facit de homine potestate hominem in actu, neque ob id est agens, quia facit hominem ad modum formae, non ad modum agentis, homo vero generans alterum hominem dicitur facere hominem tanquam agens:
It should be recognized, then, that when we say that something brings about a certain kind of actuality from a certain state of potentiality, the word “to make” or “to act” is ambiguous and can be understood in two ways: something can act (a) as a form and can also act (b) as an agent. For, certainly, the human form, arriving in matter, makes a potential human an actual human and not because it is an agent, since it makes a human being in the way a form does, not in the way an agent does. On the other hand, one man generating another is said to create a man as an agent.
differentia igitur est in hoc constituta, quod ignis generat alterum ignem & facit de igne potestate ignem actu, producendo in illa materia alteram formam ignis sibi similem; illa vero altera forma producta facit de igne potestate ignem actu, non tamen producendo aliam formam, sed ut forma ipsa quia non id facit ut agens: iungitur enim ipsi rei; at agens generans externum est, neque cum materia coniungitur.
The difference, then, consists in this: one instance of fire generates another and makes a potential fire an actual fire by producing in the designated matter another form of fire similar to it. But, when that other form is produced, it makes a potential fire an actual fire not, however, by producing another form, but specifically as a form, since it does not act as an agent: for, it is conjoined to a specific thing, whereas a generating agent is external and is not conjoined with matter.
Quando igitur Arist. dicit intellectum agentem facere phantasmata actu intelligibilia de intelligibilibus potestate, non ob id declarat rationem agentis, quia non id praestat ut agens, sed ut forma; iungitur enim phantasmatibus lumen intellectus agentis tanquam forma, qua redduntur motiva, & actu intelligibilia, sicuti lumen iungitur colori tanquam forma, & perfectio, qua redditur actu visibilis, & actu motivus visus,
neque dicitur lumen esse agens respectu colorum; quia nihil in eis producit ut agens, sed eis iungitur ut forma, per quam totum hoc coniunctum, color illuminatus, constituitur in esse obiectivo, & fit actu motivum visus:
Therefore, when Aristotle says that the agent intellect makes phantasms actually intelligible from a state of potential intelligibility, he does not by that very fact indicate the nature of an agent, because he does not present it as an agent, but as a form: for the light of the agent intellect is joined to phantasms as a form whereby they are set in motion and are made actually intelligible in the same way light comes together with color as a form and a perfection or enactment, whereby color is rendered actually visible, and vision is actually moved. Nor is light said to be an agent with respect to colors, since it produces nothing in them as an agent; rather, light comes together with them as a form by means of which a whole is conjoined, color is illuminated and brought into objective existence, and the sense of sight comes to be actually moved.
hoc significavit Arist. in eo ipso loco, dum dixit intellectum agentem facere omnia tanquam habitum quendam; habitus enim formam denotat, non causam effecticem, quia efficiens est a patiente disiunctum, forma vero iungitur materiae recipienti, & habitus rei habenti habitum; sic lumen coloribus haeret ut forma, & perfectio neque ad eos se habet ut agens ad patiens.
Aristotle indicated this in the same passage when he said that the agent intellect makes all things as an actualizing disposition or enactive ability: for, a “capacity” or an “ability” denotes a form, not an efficient cause, since, effecting movement occurs externally to the patient. But form comes together with the matter of the recipient and the actualizing disposition of a thing is an ability possessed by what has that enactive ability. In the same way, light adheres to colors as a form and an actualization or enactment and is not related to them as an agent to a patient.
[Confutatio opinionis Simplicij, & aliorium]
Non est igitur verum id, quod prima secta dicit, intellectum agentem agere in phantasmata, & argumentum eorum nullius roboris est. Decepti etiam sunt illi qui putarunt intellectum agentem agere in intellectum patientem tanquam agens disiunctum a phantasmatibus, quod extra phantasmata agendo perficiat intellectum patientem, & ipsi tribuat intellectionem; hoc enim dato, sequeretur intellectum patientem posse etiam sine phantasmatibus intelligere, nempe sumendo congnitionem immediate a solo agente; id tamen Aristot. adversatur, qui in context. 30 & 39 lib. 3 de Anima aperte dicit, fieri nunquam posse ut intellectus intelligat, nisi phantasma aliquod speculando:
[Intellectus agens non agit quatenus intelligens]
quare secundum Aristotelem omnis nostra intellectio fit ex motione facta a phantasmatibus. Immo non solum falsum est id, quod dicunt, intellectum agentem tribuere patienti suam cognitionem, sed neque ea ratione, qua est agens, est intelligens; quamvis enim necessario consequatur ut sit mens aliqua, & actu intelligens, tamen ea ratione, qua est agens, nihil formaliter intelligit, sed solum effective, quatenus in homine intellectionem producit: quomodo autem id faciat, postea declarabimus, & ostendemus intellectum agentem esse quidem semper intelligentem, agere tamen non ut intelligentem, sed ut intelligibilem:
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falsum id quoque est, quod Gandavensis dicit, intellectum agentem in intellectu patiente producere actum intelligendi; postea enim ostendimus intellectum patibilem sufficientem sibi esse ad promendam intellectionem sine ope intellectus agentis. Quocunque igitur modo dicatur intellectum patibilem pati ab intellectu agente, tanquam ab agente distinctio a phantasmatibus, & tanquam a cognoscente, falsum est & ab Arist. alienum. Quum autem utraque haec secta erraverit, erraverit etiam tertia, quae unum cum altero erro
[Refutation of Simplicius’ Opinion and of Others]
Therefore, what the first sect claims it is not the case, that the agent intellect acts upon phantasms, and their argument is entirely lacking in substance. They were also deceived who held that the agent intellect acts upon the passive intellect as an agent without acting upon phantasms, which, by acting apart phantasms, would perfect the patient intellect and contribute understanding to it. For, if that were the case, it would follow that the patient intellect would be able to understand even without images, that is, by taking cognition immediately from the agent alone; however, this conflicts with Aristotle’s view, who in contexts 30 and 39 of the De Anima clearly says that it can never occur that the intellect should think without attending to an image.
[The Activity of the Agent Intellect does not Consist in the Act of Thinking Alone]
For that reason, according to Aristotle, all our intellection arises from the motion brought about by phantasms. And indeed, what they say is not only false, when they claim that the agent intellect imparts its own cognitive activity to the the passive intellect, but it is also not the case, by that account of its agency, that it is able to think. For, even though it necessarily follows that it is a mind and actually understands, nevertheless, by that account of its agency, it understands nothing with regard to its form, but, to the extent that it produces intellectual activity in humans, it understands only as an effect. But we will explain how it does so in what follows, and will show that the agent intellect is, in fact, always thinking, though it acts not inasmuch as it is something that thinks, but inasmuch as it is intelligible.
What Jean of Jandun claims is also false, that the agent intellect produces the act of understanding in the passive intellect: for we will later show the passive intellect to be sufficient unto itself to produce understanding without the resources of the agent intellect. Therefore, in whatever way it might be said that the passive intellect undergoes change by the activity of the agent intellect, whether as an agent distinct from images or from its intellectual activity, it is false and foreign to Aristotle. But since each of these sects have erred, they have committed a third error which combines one error with another error as has been made clear by these considerations.
