De officijs intellectus agentis variae opiniones. Сар. 2
CERTUM est officium mentis agentis esse agere, hoc est trahere de potestate ad actum, {B} sed in quodnam agere dicatur, & quomodo, obscurissima res est, & maxime controversa: alij namque dicunt ipsam agere in phantasmata, non in mentem patibilem; alij in mentem patibililem, non in phantasmata; alii vero in ambo simul.
Chapter 2: Various Opinions Concerning the Activities Proper to the Agent Intellect
It is certain that the activity proper to the agent mind is to act: that is, to draw something from a state of potentiality to its actualization. {B} But what it is said to act upon and in what way is a very obscure matter and highly controversial. For, some say that it acts upon sensory phenomena, and not upon the mind in a state of potentiality; others, that it acts on the passive mind and not on sensory phenomena; and a third group claims that it acts upon both together.
[Thomas]
Prima sententia Latinorum fuit, praesertim D. Thomae, qui in 3 Libro de anima, & in prima parte summae quaestio 79, articulus 3 & 4, et in quaestionibus disputatis de spiritalibus creaturis articulo decimo & {C]} in locis fusissime de hac re loquitur, asserit rationem agentis in hoc esse constituta, ut agat in phantasmata:
[Thomas Aquinas]
The first view was held by the Latin authors, and most notably by Saint Thomas, who, in his Commentary on Book 3 of the De Anima, in the first part of the Summa, in Q. 79, articles 3 and 4, in his Disputed Questions on Created Spirits, article 10, and {C} in a very widely scattered number of places, discusses the matter and asserts that the nature of its agency consists in this: that it acts upon sensory phenomena.
[Ioannes Baconius]
eiusdem sententiae est Ioan. Bacconius in primo sententiarum quaestio 2. prologi, ubi dicit officium intellectus agentis esse propter phantasmata, & totam eius actionem in phantasmatibus terminari, neque ulterius progredi.
Pro hac opinione videtur argumentum sumi ex verbis Aristot. in contex. 13, tertii libri de anima, ubi {D} declarans officium intellectus agentis, inquit ipsum esse sicut lumen, nam lumen facit colores, qui potestate sunt, esse actu colores: quemadmodum igitur lumen non agit in oculum, sed in obiectum colorem, & ipsum ducit de potestate ad actum; ita intellectus agens agit in phantasmata, non in intellectum patibiliem;
ideo potest inde colligi argumentum tale: officium omnis agentis est trahere de potestate ad actum; sed Aristoteles hoc officium tribuit intellectui agenti ratione obiectorum, facit enim de intellectis potestate actu intellecta; ergo in phantasmata agit, non in intellectum patibilem.
[John Baconthorpe]
John Baconthorpe holds the same opinion in the prologue to the first book of his Commentary on the Sentences, Q. 2, where he writes that the activity proper to the agent intellect is concerned with sensory phenomena, that the entirety of its action is completed in them, and that its activity proceeds no further.
In favor of this opinion, it appears that the argument is taken from Aristotle’s text in Context 13, of the third book of the De Anima, where, {D} when he is speaking of the the activity proper to the agent intellect, he says that it is like light, since light makes colors that are in a state of potentiality exist as actual colors. Therefore, just as light does not act upon the eye, but on the colored object and takes it from a state of potentiality to one of actuality, so the agent intellect acts upon sensory phenomena and not upon the passive intellect.
It therefore follows that an argument of the following kind can be gathered from that text: [1] the activity proper to every agent is to draw from a state of potentiality to one of actuality; but [2] Aristotle assigns this function to the agent intellect due to its relationship to its objects: for, it causes what is potentially intelligible to be actually understood. Therefore, [3] it acts upon sensory phenomena and not upon the passive intellect.
[Simplicius]
{E} Contra vero Simplicius videtur ei totam actionem tribuere respectu intellectus patibilis; putat enim utrunque esse unam & eandem substantiam, & unum intellectum, qui ut in se manens dicatur agens, & ut progressus dicatur patibilis; {A} quoniam ipse ut in se manens seipsum ut progressum ducit de potestate ad actum, de imperfectione ad perfectionem. Hanc sententiam Averroes in commentario quinto tertii libri de anima Themistio attribuit, attamen non satis liquet Themistiarum fuisse huius opinionis.
[Simplicius]
On the other hand, Simplicius is seen to attribute its entire activity to the passive intellect. For he thought that each was one and the same substance and a single intellect, which, while it abides in itself is called an agent and when it has come forth is called “passive,” {A} since, while it abides in itself, it draws itself forth so that it may advance from a state of potentiality toward its actualization, from imperfection to fulfillment. Averroes attributed this opinion to Themistius in his Commentary 5 on the third book of the De Anima, although, it is not quite clear that this was the opinion of Themistius.
[Ioannes Gandauensis]
Hanc eandem sequitur Ioannes Gandavensis in quaestiones 24 & 25 tertii libri de anima, ubi totam actionem intellectus agentis inquit esse in intellectum patibilem, non in phantasmata, & ipsum in intellectu patibili producere actum intelligendi.
Pro hac sententia sumitur argumentum ex Aristoteli in contextu 17 eiusdem libri, ubi ex eo quod detur intellectus patiens, infert dari etiam intellectum agentem propterea quod omni patienti respondet aliquod agens: vult igitur Arist. intellectum patientem, & ut agat in eum: ratio nanque illa vana esset, nisi agens ageret in illudmet patiens, cui respondere debet:
hoc idem Aristotelis exempla declarant; inquit enim intellectum agentem ita se habere ad intellectu patibilem, ut ars ad materiam se habet, ars autem in materiam agit; ita materia prima est patiens, in quod agunt omnia agentia naturalia; quare etiam intellectus patibilis dicitur patiens respectu agentis: nomen quoque ipsum hoc ostendit; non enim phantasmata vocavit patientia, sed ipsum patibilem intellectum, in hunc itaque voluit agere intellectum agentem.
[Jean of Jandun]
Jean of Jandun follows this same view in questions 24 and 25 in the third book of the Quaestiones de Anima, where he said that the entire action of the agent intellect is upon the passive intellect, not upon images, and that it brings about the act of understanding in the passive intellect.
In favor of this view, an argument is taken from Aristotle’s works in context 17 of the same book, where, from the fact that a passive intellect is present, Aristotle infers that an agent intellect must also be present, according as to every potentiality there corresponds an actualizing agent. Aristotle therefore intended that there should be a patient intellect and that an agent should act upon it: for, the above reasoning would be pointless unless the agent were to act upon the very patient to which it must correspond.
Aristotle’s examples express this same idea. For instance, he says that the agent intellect is related to the potential intellect as an art or craft is disposed toward to its material and as an art or craft acts upon its material or subject matter. Thus, primary matter is the patient upon which all natural agents act. Therefore, the passive intellect is called a “patient” with respect to its agent. Its very name also indicates this: for he did not call phantasms patients, but rather the passive intellect itself. Therefore, he intended for the agent intellect to act upon the patient intellect.
[Averroes]
Averroes autem varius fuisse videtur: quandoque enim asserit actionem intellectus agentis requiri propter intellectum patibilem, ut ipsum ad actum ducat, atque perficiat; quandoque propter phantasmata, ut ea transferat de gradu in gradum, hoc est de materialibus faciat immaterialia, & de intellectis potestate actu intellecta: quare videtur Averroes existimasse officium intellectus agentis requiri propter utranque actionem, ductus fortasse utrisque argumentis ex verbis Aristotelis sumptis, quibus duas priores sectas usas esse diximus; nam Aristotelis in contextu decimoseptimo, tertii libri de anima, dicere videtur intellectum agentem agere in intellectum patibilem, deinde in decimooctavo videtur assere ipsum agere etiam in phantasmata.
[Averroes]
But Averroes, it seems, held a different view. For, sometimes he asserts that the action of the actualizing agent is required for the sake of the passive intellect, so that it might bring itself to a state of actuality and perfect itself, fulfilling its own potential. At other times, he says that the activity of the agent intellect is for the sake of images, so that it may transfer them from one state to the next-that is, so that it may produce immaterial objects from material ones and objects that are actually understood from ones that are potentially intelligible. For that reason, Averroes seems to have held that the activity proper to the agent intellect is required for each action, and was guided, perhaps, by both arguments drawn from Aristotle’s text, that we said the two prior sects made use of. For, Aristotle, in Context 17 of Book III of the De Anima seems to say that the agent intellect acts upon the passive intellect, and then, in contextus 18, he seems to assert that it also acts upon images.
[Recentiores]
Ideo sententiam hanc nonnulli recentiores sequuti sunt, qui eam magis declarantes dixerunt intellectum agentem esse idem re cum intellectu patibili, & esse cognoscentem, & eatenus in illum agere, quatenus tribuit illi cognitionem ut hac ratione dicatur intellectionem producere, quia intellecui patibili tribuit cognitionem, quam ipse agens prius habebat. Haec sunt, quae ab aliis dicuntur, a me brevissime collecta.
[More Recent Interpreters]
For that reason, several recent authors have followed this opinion, who, expanding upon it in their own expositions, have said that the agent intellect is one in substance with the passive intellect, that it acquires knowledge, and that, to the extent that it acts upon it, it brings about the acquisition of knowledge in it, so that it is said to produce intellectual activity for the following reason: since it brings about the acquisition of knowledge in the passive intellect that the agent intellect first possessed. These are the opinions which are given by others, which I have very briefly collected.
