Translator’s note: As of February 2023, this is an ongoing work in progress. There is a comment box at the bottom of each page that allows you to make suggestions if anyone spots an eror. That being said, I am going to throw out the usual caveat that I am angling toward a fluid, idiomatic English presentation over a stilted, stricly literal translation.
Propositio ac dispositio dicendorum: Cap. I
{1007 A} PRAETER humanum mentem, quae patibilis dicitur, censuit Aristoteles necessariam esse alteram mentem agentem, sine qua nequeat in homine intellectio fieri, ea ductus ratione, quod ubi est aliquod patiens, {B} quod in aliquo genere omnia recipere, & omnia fieri aptum sit, necesse est ut illi respondeat agens, quod illius generis omnia facere possit: quoniam igitur humna mens patiendo intelligit, & apta est omnia fieri; necesse est aliquod illi agens respondere, quod omnia inelligibilia faciat, idque non esse nisi mentem: quo sit ut duae in humana intellectione mentes considerandae sint, una patiens, de qua nos in aliis libris egimus, {C} altera vero agens, de qua in hoc libro agendum nobis proposuimus; etenim tum ob eius dignitatem, tum ob summam difficultatem, tum etiam ob ipsius in humana intellectione necessitatem dignissima res est, quae accurate tratectur, ac declaretur;
Chapter 1: The Principal Theme to be Discussed and the Order of its Treatment
{1007 A} Apart from the human mind, which is referred to as “passive,” Aristotle thought that another mind, an agent, was necessary, without which intellectual activity could not occur in the human species, guided by the reasoning that where there is a passive element {B} that, for any general kind, receives all things, and is able to become all things, it is necessary that there should correspond to it an agent of the same generic kind that is able to make or produce all things. Therefore, since the human mind understands by means of its passivity and is able to become all things, it is necessary that there should be a corresponding agent that produces all intelligible objects, and this cannot occur apart from a mind. It therefore follows that two minds must be considered in human intellectual activity: one, a “patient” intellect, which we have discussed in other books; {C} the other, an agent, which we have set out to discuss in this book, and, in fact, because of its dignity, its great difficulty, and also because of its necessity for human understanding, it is a most worthy subject that ought to be taught and explicated with accuracy.
Duo autem sunt, in quibus tota est huiusce rei difficultas constituta: unum, quid sit haec mens agens, an sit pars aliqua animae nostrae, necne, & quae sit eius officia in nostra intellectione; {D} nam ipse quoque Aristoteles haec utraque de mente agente in 3. de anima libro tractasse comperitur: et quamvis ordine naturae dicendum prius esset de ipsius essentia, postea vero de officiis, tamen in hoc quoque Aristotelis imitati de officiis agemus, deinde vero de eius natura; progrediendum enim semper est a facilioribus, & ab iis, quorum cognitio ducere nos facilius in aliorum notitiam possit; cognitis enim huius intellectus officiis, facilius quid ipse sit {E} indagare, atque invenire poterimus; quod etiam Aristotelem movit, ut prius de ipsius in humana intellectione officiis, postea vero de essentia loqueretur.
However, there are two questions upon which the entire difficulty of this subject is founded: (1) “What is this agent mind?” “Is it part of our soul or not?”; and (2) “What is its role in our intellectual activity?”: {D} for, Aristotle himself is found to take up each of these two questions concerning the agent mind as well in Book III of his De Anima. Furthermore, although, according to the order of nature, its essence ought first to be discussed and afterward its proper activities, nevertheless, in this case too, in imitation of Aristotle, we will consider its proper activities and then its nature: for, one should always progress from what is easier and from those things the understanding of which might lead us more easily into the knowledge of other things. For, when the activities proper to this intellect have become known, we will be able to investigate and to discover with greater ease what it itself is {E}, which also guided Aristotle’s thinking, since he addresses first the activities it has that are proper to human understanding, but afterward its essence.
Id tamen ante omnia protestari velim, me hac de re secundum principia tantum philosophiae {1008 A} Aristotelis esse disputaturum, quum non aliud in his omnibus libris consilium meum sit, quam quid senserit Aristoteles, investigare, et eius sententiam, quantum in me est, planam, & manifestam reddere.
But I would like to assert the following prior to any other consideration: I intend to take up a discourse on this subject according to the principles of Aristotle’s philosophy {1008 A} alone, since my purpose in all these books is to investigate nothing apart from what Aristotle thought and to make his intention clear and evident, insofar as I am able.
